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DESIGNING AN EXPERIMENTAL GAMING  
PLATFORM FOR TRADING GRID RESOURCES 
DANNY OH, CHENG SHIH-FEN and MA DAN 
School of Information Systems 
Singapore Management University 
RAVI BAPNA 
Centre for Information Technology and the Networked Economy 
Indian School of Business 
This paper describes our current work in designing an experimental gaming platform for 
simulating the trading of grid resources. The open platform allows researchers in grid 
economics to experiment with different market structures and pricing models.  We would 
be using a design science approach in the implementation. Key design considerations 
and an overview of the functional design of the platform are presented and discussed. 
1.   Introduction 
Utility computing is a recent and exciting development in IT outsourcing 
whereby IT resources are provided as needed and the customer pays only for 
actual use. Companies who wish to provide shared computing facilities to 
customers often face the challenge on how to price their services. For example, 
Sun, IBM and HP have all adopted the fixed price model for various practical 
reasons. However, the fixed price model may not lead to an economically-
efficient resource allocation, especially when market demand is high and 
volatile. The question then arises as to what economic market mechanisms are 
suitable for facilitating price discovery and economic valuation based resource 
allocation for shared computing services. Currently, little market data is 
available to test the efficacy of current approaches. Yet, such data are critical to 
build and test theories of consumer behavior and choice in the utility computing 
context. In addition, the experimental data provide a data source in situations 
where relevant field data cannot be obtained. This motivates us to develop an 
experimental platform for understanding the dynamics of trading of computing 
resources. 
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2.   Motivation 
To do research in grid economics, it is essential for researchers to have a 
platform which allows them to design and test various market models and pricing 
strategies. To the best of our knowledge, there is no such publicly available 
simulation system yet. In this work, we use the design science approach [5] to 
conceptualize a novel IT artifact that permits real human players and automated 
agents to trade in computing resources to accomplish jobs for which they  
have monetary values, as well as to sell unused computing capacity on their 
networked machines. 
3.   Design Science Approach 
As per Hevner et al. (2004), the first step in pursuing the design science 
approach is to design an IT artifact. In that spirit, the availability of an open-
sourced market simulation system will allow researchers to conduct experiments 
on various pricing mechanisms such as different types of auction and negotiation 
models, posted price model, and different tariff structures of pricing models. 
These pricing and allocation mechanisms will be evaluated in the context of an 
experimental trading environment that is designed using the principles of 
induced value theory [12]. 
4.   Research Contributions 
The key research question of this work is to evaluate various market models  
and pricing strategies for the trading of grid resources so as to make 
recommendations for suitable ones. Additionally, we are also interested to find 
out how uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes compare viz efficiency and 
fairness given rationally bounded agents? Finally, we are keen to determine if it 
is feasible to introduce spot and future prices for CPU and storage commodities. 
5.   Market Game Simulation Platform 
Instead of developing a full fledged market simulation system from scratch, we 
will take advantage of existing systems which have already been developed for 
the running of market games. Examples of such systems include AB3D [6], 
AuctionBot [8], e-Game [7], eMediator [11] and Meet2Trade [2]. To the best of 
our knowledge, the only openly available system is AB3D. Therefore, in this 
project, we will use AB3D as the software foundation for our development. 
For all these scenarios, there are two major components: 1) agents that 
represent individual decision makers, and 2) market mechanisms that allow 
Yan, Lee-Hing, et al. <i>GCA 2007 : Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Grid Computing and
         Application</i>, World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd, 2007. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/smu/detail.action?docID=312360.
Created from smu on 2019-11-17 22:58:31.
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 2
00
7.
 W
or
ld
 S
cie
nt
ific
 P
ub
lis
hi
ng
 C
o 
Pt
e 
Lt
d.
 A
ll r
ig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
 204 
exchange of resources. Due to the decentralized nature of the problem, most 
agent-specific information, including preferences over tasks, capabilities in 
performing tasks and resource holdings, are endowed to each agent. Moreover, 
probability distributions are usually used in describing much of this information 
to account for uncertainties involved in the problem. This probabilistic 
representation of the problem makes it very difficult to analytically evaluate the 
performances of combinations of strategies. 
To estimate the performances of combinations of strategies, we can define a 
market game as a collection of agents and market mechanisms, and execute 
Monte Carlo simulations, in which each agent’s related information is generated 
according to the governing distribution. The AB3D platform is developed to 
support massive simulation efforts. In the following paragraphs, we provide 
more details on the various components of the platform. The interactions of the 
above components are illustrated in Figure 1. 
• Scripting auction engine. AB3D supports a wide range of market 
mechanisms, specified in a high-level rule-based auction scripting language. 
The scripting language exposes parameters characterizing the space of 
bidding, information revelation, and allocation policies [9]. With proper 
programming constructs, flow control can also be easily achieved. 
• Market game engine. To generate a market game probabilistically, we need 
to provide both common information and agent-specific information, as 
described as follows: 
o Common information: this refers to important information agents  
should know even before the game is actually executed. Most common 
information is related to the structure of the game, including (but not 
limited to): i) length of the game, ii) number of agents in the game, and 
their respective roles, if any (e.g., buyer, seller), and iii) number and type 
of auctions used in the game. 
o Agent-specific information: in a typical decentralized resource allocation 
problem, each agent is endowed with information that is only accessible 
to itself. This information may include task properties (e.g., the value for 
fulfilling the task, the deadline of the task, and the resource requirement 
of the task), and initial resource endowment. To support probabilistic 
game generation, a set of programming constructs, called game 
description language (GDL) is developed to support basic variable 
declarations, looping, and random variable generations. A detailed 
description on GDL is available in Ref. 10. 
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• Agent interface. The game system implements a communication interface 
through which bids, queries, and any other game interactions are transmitted. 
• Scorer. The scorer evaluates the performance of each agent at the end of 
each game. Scoring typically entails the assembly of transactions to 
determine final holdings, and for each agent, an allocation of resources to 
activities maximizing its own objective function. For each agent and the 
strategy it represents, this score indicates how well it performs in this 
particular strategy combination for some realization of the agent preferences. 
• Market control room. An important element of the design science approach 
is to build in an iterative methodology that searches for gaps between the 
design objectives and the observed metrics. To achieve this, a market control 
room will be created which is under the control of the researcher. It takes as 
input the performance metrics, such as efficiency measures and profits, from 
the monitoring of the market and sets a variety of system level parameters 
that are in constant need of fine tuning and exploration. 
• WS-Agreement Generator. The outcome of the games (i.e. resources to be 
allocated per agent) will be composed as WS-Agreements. WS-Agreement is 
a XML based language and protocol designed for advertising the capabilities 
of resource providers and creating service agreements, and for monitoring 
agreement compliance at runtime. It is the proposed standard for the Grid 
Resource Allocation Agreement Protocol [4]. 
 
 
Figure 1: General market gaming platform, depicted at functional level. 
 
With this general market gaming platform, we can execute large number of 
simulations in order to accurately estimate the payoff for each agent strategy in a 
strategy combination. Note that since it is possible that multiple copies of the 
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same strategy may appear in a strategy combination, when estimating the payoff 
associated with some strategy, we compute the average payoff for all agents 
using this strategy, and let the average payoff be the estimated payoff of this 
strategy. 
6.   Market and Pricing Models  
We plan to use the market gaming platform to experiment with different  
market models. Existing literature focuses more on market-based models [1,3]. 
Therefore, in the initial phase, we plan to support the commodity market model 
and auction model first. Other models such as bargaining model and tendering 
model will be supported in subsequent phases. 
We also plan to experiment with different pricing models. We will take the 
fixed pricing model as benchmark, and study and compare it with other pricing 
models. We are interested in examining how vendor profit, consumer surplus, as 
well as social welfare will change under different pricing models. As a result, we 
are able to identify the optimal resource allocation strategy. 
In the initial phase, we will focus on different variations of the auction-
based pricing. In particular, we are very interested to model the market as a 
multi-attribute combinatorial exchange since it allows multiple buyers and sellers 
to simultaneously submit bids on heterogeneous services. Support for other 
models such as multi-part tariffs will be available in subsequent phases.  
Since different businesses have different requirements, goals, policies and 
strategies, we expect a grid market to support a variety of market models. It is 
important to understand how each of these models affects allocation fairness, 
system efficiency and performance. 
7.   Conclusion 
In this paper, we describe our current work in developing an experimental 
gaming platform for trading of grid resources. We also describe key design 
considerations such as the different ways of commoditizing grid resources, 
market structures and pricing models which have significant impacts in the 
design of the platform. Moving forward, we would be concentrating on 
developing the gaming platform and designing games for real players and 
automated agents involving the trading of grid resources. We hope to use the 
platform to gather data that will help us answer our research questions and to 
further understand the entire Grid economy concept. 
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